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Abstract 
 
We build on a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model 
to explore the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal expansionary shocks during the 
economic crisis of 2008 in the eurozone. In this setting, we find that the big four eurozone 
economies (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) can effectively escape from their liquidity 
trap through fiscal policy interventions caused by government purchases. We estimate the 
government spending multiplier to be above 1.8 when this policy is associated with a 
long-term commitment to keeping the nominal interest rate at the zero lower bound, as 
suggested by Krugman (1998). Notably, the short-term deficit effect on the budget bal-
ance can be offset five years after the implementation of a large spending program. We 
also show that alternative policies with tax cuts that expand the supply do not appear to 
have the same power in the short run. Moreover, we provide novel empirical evidence 
that a large government debt renders a government spending policy ineffective.  
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1. Introduction 
It would be extremely helpful if central banks could count on other policymakers, par-
ticularly fiscal policymakers, to take on some of the burden of stabilizing the econo-
my during the next recession.  
(Ben S. Bernanke1) 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 led to a global recession and to an intense debate about 
the limitations of monetary policy and the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli. After years of mas-
sive stimulus policies with nominal interest rates at the zero lower bound from the major cen-
tral banks in the United States, Europe, and Japan, inflation remains stubbornly low and the 
global economies have not recovered as much as expected. As stated by the former Federal 
Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke at the Brookings Institute, and as highlighted a few weeks later 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) Chair Mario Draghi, central banks are close to the lim-
its of what their stimulus policies (widely known as quantitative easing) can achieve; there-
fore, fiscal policymakers have to take action and complement these policies.2 Notably, Japan 
recently applied large fiscal expansions but failed to stimulate the demand and to escape from 
its liquidity trap.  
Consequently, the effectiveness of the expansionary fiscal policy has been challenged 
and questioned. What is the effect of a government spending shock? How does the output re-
spond to a tax cut when the interest rates are at the zero lower bound? How does the fiscal 
multiplier change when the zero bound is not binding? The answers from the existing litera-
ture are not conclusive. While some authors, such as Cogan et al. (2010), find a multiplier be-
low unity from a New Keynesian model, others, such as Ramey (2011a), predict the multipli-
er to be above 1.0, depending on the timing. Additionally, Christiano et al. (2011) document 
																																								 																				
1 Article in the Brookings Institute blog, September 13, 2016, entitled “Modifying the Fed’s policy framework: 
Does a higher inflation target beat negative interest rates?”  
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/09/13/modifying-the-feds-policy-framework-does-a-
higher-inflation-target-beat-negative-interest-rates/ 
2 Remarks in the European Parliament, Brussels, September 25, 2016.  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160926_2.en.html 
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that the government spending multiplier is above 1.0 when the central bank commits to con-
stant interest rates over the long run and below 1.0 otherwise.  
The debate is especially intense in Europe, where, quite recently, though without suc-
cess since growth remains anemic, the ECB ramped up its stimulus program repeatedly by 
cutting deposit interest rates even below zero and accelerating its monthly bond purchase 
program.3 Should eurozone economies have adopted a more aggressive unconventional fiscal 
policy to boost growth? How do tax cuts and government spending affect their economic 
growth under the actual economic circumstances? In this paper, we address these critical is-
sues by examining the effectiveness of a government spending shock and an income tax cut 
at the zero lower bound to provide novel empirical evidence for the four largest eurozone 
economies, namely Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. We also compare the findings ob-
tained with those of a positive nominal interest rate policy to determine how the fiscal multi-
plier changes in a distinctively different interest rate setting.  
We build our theoretical framework on a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model developed by Eggertsson (2010) and extended by Denes et al. 
(2013), in which they examine the effects of government purchase shocks and tax cuts on the 
stimulation of an economy when the zero lower bound is binding. In the model, the economy 
is subject to government spending and tax cut shocks, while the nominal interest rate is al-
lowed to remain at the zero lower bound and does not respond to changes in the fiscal policy. 
The long-term commitment to generating inflation by keeping the nominal interest rate con-
stant at the zero lower bound is similar in spirit to Christiano et al. (2011). Accordingly, the 
model allows us to use a strict Taylor rule policy. Under this rule the expansionary policy 
shock creates inflation and leads to higher interest rates. when the nominal interest rate rises 
in response to an expansionary policy shock, which creates inflation. Another key assumption 
																																								 																				
3 See Joyce et al. (2012) for an analysis of the European Central Bank (ECB) quantitative easing program, Eser 
and Schwaab (2016) for a detailed discussion on the securities market program employed by the ECB, and Bou-
baker et al. (2017) on the role of unconventional monetary policies in risk and asset allocation decisions.	
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is that lump sum taxes are used to budget the government balance and to finance government 
spending. Our work modifies some of the theoretical assumptions of Eggertsson (2010) and 
Denes et al. (2013), such as tax cuts and the inflation rate at the zero lower bound, and focus-
es on the short- and medium-run effects of these policies on the stimulation of growth. Nota-
bly, only two previous empirical papers estimate fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound 
(Ramey, 2011a for the United States; Crafts and Mills, 2013 for the United Kingdom), and 
only one compares the differences between the zero lower bound and the positive nominal in-
terest rate policies in the United States (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018).4 In addition, our paper 
contributes to the standard fiscal multiplier literature by showing that the government spend-
ing multiplier is larger than 1.0 and that tax cuts fail to stimulate growth effectively in the big 
four eurozone economies. Most estimates of the multiplier in previous studies are between 
0.5 and 0.8 (e.g., Cogan et al., 2010; Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011). 
At the calibration stage, we empirically map the New Keynesian DSGE model into a 
state-space model that allows for a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) analysis with 
macroeconomic variables and exogenous shocks. This approach is similar in spirit to the 
methods proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011). We 
particularly examine the effects of government spending and tax cuts in three scenarios: (i) 
the interest rate is at the zero lower bound but following the change in fiscal policy in that the 
nominal interest rate rises and the zero lower bound does not bind; (ii) the interest rate is at 
the zero lower bound and does not respond to the fiscal policy shocks, and hence the zero 
bound is binding from the short to the medium term; (iii) there is a government budget con-
straint that does not allow the government balance to exceed the 3.0% deficit due to a large 
government debt in the first year of government fiscal intervention.   
																																								 																				
4	In a related study, Leeper et al. (2010) use a neoclassical growth model to identify the effectiveness of an ex-
pansionary fiscal policy when it dynamically adjusts to the level of economic activity and to changes in the level 
of government debt. However, their work does not consider the interactions between fiscal policy and monetary 
policy, particularly when the nominal interest rate is near or at the zero lower bound.	
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We show that a positive shock to government spending (investment and consumption) 
can stimulate the eurozone economies effectively. In particular, when the nominal interest 
rate is at the zero lower bound and does not respond to government spending shocks and to 
an increase in inflation, the government spending multiplier becomes almost twice as large, 
since it is estimated to be higher than 1.8 for all four eurozone economies. In this scenario, 
the central bank focuses purely on stimulating the output, future inflation is allowed to in-
crease, and the zero lower bound is binding from the short to the medium term, resembling 
the paradox of thrift as analyzed by Keynes (1936). As a result, the short-run effects on the 
output with a zero interest rate policy are substantially affected by the long-run expectation 
that the nominal interest rates will stay at the zero lower bound. Krugman (1998) suggests 
that policy commitments to keeping the interest rate at zero for a longer period, compared 
with the no-commitment policy, is an effective way to stimulate an economy. Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003, 2004) argue that an economy can escape from the liquidity trap at the zero 
bound with a commitment to future high inflation. More precisely, the implementation of a 
government spending program can stabilize an economy in a time-consistent way (a maxi-
mum of three years from the implementation) with a positive long-run effect on the tax reve-
nues. Importantly, the short-term effect on the budget balance can be offset and improved 
five years after the implementation of this policy. On the contrary, in the same nominal inter-
est rate scenario, tax cuts are estimated to have an effect on the output that is much smaller 
than 1.0. A similar scenario is simulated by Christiano et al. (2011) for the US economy, and 
the government spending multiplier is estimated to be much larger than 1.0.  
We also simulate a scenario in which, following government spending shocks and in-
flationary pressures, the nominal interest rates increase and the zero lower bound is not bind-
ing. In this case, the government spending multiplier is much lower, between 1.0 and 1.1. 
Moreover, the effect of tax cuts on the output is very low, from 0.1 to 0.2. Therefore, tax cuts 
when the zero lower bound is not binding are not an effective method of stimulating the big 
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four eurozone economies. Moreover, we find that a large government debt significantly af-
fects the size of both government spending and tax multipliers, rendering these policies inef-
fective.  
Overall, our findings suggest that an unconventional fiscal policy with an increase in 
government purchases along with a zero lower bound policy is effective in stimulating 
growth in the big four eurozone economies as well in counteracting a recession and deflation-
ary pressures. Moreover, our results are in line with the works of Cogan et al. (2010) and 
Christiano et al. (2011), which show that government spending multipliers should be large 
and effective to stimulate an economy at the zero lower bound. Eggertsson (2010) and Denes 
et al. (2013) take one step further by analyzing both the effects of government spending 
shocks and many different tax cuts at the zero lower bound.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature 
review. Section 3 presents the methodological approach. Section 4 depicts the data set and 
analyzes the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The issue of the zero bound nominal interest rate constraint when expansionary monetary 
policy fails to stimulate the aggregate demand was first developed as a theoretical possibility 
by Keynes (1936) and gave rise to a macroeconomic phenomenon commonly known as a “li-
quidity trap.” For decades, the question regarding the appropriate policy at the zero bound 
constraint has been considered to be of doubtful practical importance. The standard Keynes-
ian prescription, as described by Hicks (1937) in the work that introduces the IS–LM model 
along with the liquidity trap, is to launch expansionary fiscal measures to stimulate the econ-
omy. However, the economic crisis in Japan, where the overnight rate has been stuck at zero 
for about twenty years, and the global economic recession of 2008 generated renewed interest 
in and triggered debates about the role of fiscal interventions in stimulating an economy. The 
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existing literature, for instance, provides mixed evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
interventions. There are mainly two strands that examine the size of the government spending 
multiplier: the neoclassical and the new Keynesian models.5 Using neoclassical models, Ai-
yagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King (1993) show that a permanent increase in govern-
ment purchases, which is financed by “non-distortionary means,” causes a negative wealth ef-
fect in the economy. In response, households decrease their consumption and increase their 
labor supply, creating an increase in output. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ reduced-
form vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques and find that government spending shocks have 
a small but positive effect on output while tax shocks have a negative effect. Beetsma and 
Giuliodori (2011) find that government purchases have a small but positive effect in the EU 
countries.   
In a more recent study, Ramey and Zubairy (2018) estimate that US government 
spending state-dependent multipliers are below unity both during periods of economic slack 
and when interest rates are at the zero lower bound. On the contrary, Caggiano et al. (2015) 
and Leeper et al. (2017) find a multiplier larger than one using VAR models and Bayesian 
prior and posterior analysis, respectively. Canzoneri et al. (2015) document a state-dependent 
multiplier above two during recessionary periods. Leeper et al. (2010) employ a conventional 
DSGE model to examine the dynamic responses of fiscal instruments to the level of econom-
ic activity and to the level of government debt in the United States. They estimate the fiscal 
multipliers for output, consumption, and investment and mainly document that, when all the 
fiscal instruments respond to debt, the multipliers do not exceed one. Fiscal multipliers can 
also differ across horizons (short versus long run). More importantly, Leeper et al. (2010) 
note that their study does not take into account the possible interactions between fiscal policy 
and monetary policy, which could induce dramatic changes in the fiscal multipliers, essential-
																																								 																				
5 For a brief analysis of the neoclassical and the New Keynesian literature on the government spending multipli-
er, please also see Ramey (2011b).     
8 
	
ly when the monetary policy follows a predetermined set of rules or when the nominal inter-
est rate is at the zero lower bound. 
Based on the New Keynesian models, Cogan et al. (2010) document smaller fiscal 
multipliers that are usually below unity. Krugman (1998) is among the first to study the im-
plications for monetary and fiscal policies in a liquidity trap at the zero lower bound and pro-
pose a long-term commitment to a zero nominal interest rate as the optimal solution. Subse-
quently, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) show that keeping the nominal interest rate 
at the zero lower bound for a long period is an effective policy to generate inflation and stim-
ulate an economy in a liquidity trap. Galí et al. (2007) also obtain small multipliers within a 
New Keynesian model when employment is demand-determined and workers are always 
willing to supply optimally, while the multiplier can be two when the marginal propensity to 
consume is higher than it would be if consumers behaved optimally. Fernandez-Villaverde et 
al. (2015) argue that the most effective way to study liquidity trap dynamics is to take non-
linearities into account explicitly to analyze the behavior of the New Keynesian model at the 
zero lower bound.   
Eggertsson (2010) proposes a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model to investigate the effect of government purchases and tax cuts when the zero 
lower bound becomes binding and the economy experiences deflation and output contraction. 
The model shows that tax cuts are contractionary while the government spending multiplier 
can be as high as five in the US economy. The author argues that the main problem in a zero 
lower bound environment is the insufficient demand. Building on the same New Keynesian 
model, Denes et al. (2013) observe that the effect of fiscal policy at the zero lower bound can 
be either contractionary or expansionary depending on the interactions with the expectations 
about the long-run tax cuts and government purchases. Similarly, Christiano et al. (2011) find 
that the government spending multiplier can be larger than one in the US economy when the 
zero lower bound is binding. In a similar vein, Mertens and Ravn (2014) show that, in a li-
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quidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence, the government spending mul-
tiplier can be larger than one. The results in the study by Correia et al. (2013) indicate that an 
alternative path to stimulate the US economy at the zero lower bound is to cut taxes rather 
than to increase government purchases. Finally, Blanchard et al. (2010) evaluate the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Plan and suggest that better integration between monetary 
and fiscal policy is needed when the zero lower bound is reached to escape from a liquidity 
trap.  
 
 
3. The Model 
In this section, we develop a standard New Keynesian DSGE model to analyze the effect of 
an increase in government spending and a cut in income tax on output. The model builds on 
and is similar in spirit to the one introduced by Eggertsson (2010), which is then extended by 
Denes et al. (2013).  
Our model differs from that of Eggertsson (2010) and Denes et al. (2013) in five main 
aspects: (i) we assume two distinctively different shocks 𝜉" in the model when the zero bound 
is binding: an increase in government spending and a decrease in income taxes; (ii) govern-
ment spending in our model is an imperfect substitute for private consumption, so we allow 
an increase in government spending to be followed by an increase in private consumption and 
vice versa; (iii) our assumption is that households’ consumption is a function of – and there-
fore is affected by – income tax and that households consume goods net of taxes (this is a 
more realistic approach than the treatment of income tax in the existing literature; temporarily 
cutting income tax is an example of effective fiscal policy6); (iv) the government budget con-
straint developed by Denes et al. (2013) and the aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate sup-
																																								 																				
6 As analyzed by Eggertsson (2010), a tax cut is helpful not because of its effect on the aggregate supply but be-
cause it directly stimulates the aggregate spending. Similarly, a temporary increase in government spending is 
effective because it directly increases the overall spending in the economy. However, for government spending 
to be effective in increasing the demand, it has to be directed to goods that are imperfect substitutes with private 
consumption (such as infrastructure spending). Otherwise, government spending will be offset by cuts in private 
spending, leaving the aggregate spending unchanged. 
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ply (AS) developed by Eggertsson (2010) are modified based on our assumption that there 
are only lump sum and income taxes; and (v) we relax the assumption related to the inflation 
constraint by allowing for positive inflation in the steady state, and as a result the interest 
rates are allowed to remain at the zero lower bound not only in the short run but also in the 
long run, even when the inflationary pressures increase significantly. This allows our model 
to take into account the zero lower bound commitment proposed by Krugman (1998) and 
hence to test its effectiveness in accordance with an expansionary fiscal policy. 
3.1 The cashless economy 
3.1.1 Households 
The model works in a cashless economy with uncertainty in period t ≥ 0, where, for simplici-
ty, the only assets traded are one-period riskless bonds, 𝐵". Within this setting, and as is 
standard in the New Keynesian literature, there is a continuum of households of measure 1, 
and the representative household has a set of preferences described over aggregate consump-
tion 𝐶" and maximizes utility, 𝑈, as given by 𝑈 = 𝐸" 	 𝛽*+,𝜉* 𝑢(𝐶* + 𝑔 𝐺* − 𝑣(𝑙* 𝑗 )𝑑8,9 ,;*<"      (1) 
where 𝛽 is a discount factor, 𝜉* is a preference shock, 𝐶* 	≡ 	 𝑐"(𝑖)@+,/@𝑑𝑖 @/(@+,),9  is the 
Dixit–Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of each of a continuum of differentiated goods with 
an elasticity of substitution between varieties equal to 𝜃 > 1,		 𝑃" ≡ 	 𝑝"(𝑖),+@𝑑𝑖],/(,+@),9  is 
the Dixit–Stiglitz price index, and 𝑙* 𝑗  is the quantity supplied of labor  𝑙" of type 𝑗. 𝐺* rep-
resents the aggregate government spending and is exogenously defined as a Dixit–Stiglitz ag-
gregator of public consumption, but it is not substitutable for private consumption.7 Each in-
dustry	𝑗 employs an industry-specific type of labor, with its own real wage 𝑊"(𝑗). 𝑢(∙) and 𝑔(∙) are increasing concave functions and 𝑣(∙) an increasing convex function.  
																																								 																				
7 Eggertsson (2010) introduces two terms of government spending, 𝐺*J and 𝐺*K, that differ in how they enter util-
ity, the first term being perfectly substitutable for private consumption. 
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Since we do not examine the optimal fiscal policy, the model has two types of taxes: a 
lump sum tax 𝑇", which is a residual variable that adjusts over time so that the government 
budget constraint can always be satisfied, and an income tax 𝜏"N on income from both labor 
and households’ claim on firms’ profits (e.g. dividends). Income tax plays an important role 
in our model, since it is used as a tool to identify the effects of a tax cut on the output when 
calibrating the model. In addition, risk-free bond returns and dividend payments do not have 
different tax treatment, because identifying the optimal policy is not the focus of this study 
and therefore a different interpretation does not change any of the results. Households take 
prices (𝑃") and wages (𝑊") as given. Consequently, the period budget constraint can be writ-
ten as: (1 + 𝜏"N)𝑃"𝐶" + 𝐵" = 1 + 𝑖"+, 𝐵"+, + 1 + 𝜏"N 	 𝑍" 𝑖 𝑑𝑖 + 𝑃"𝐶" 𝑊" 𝑗 𝑙" 𝑗 𝑑𝑗,9,9 − 𝑃"𝑇",𝑡 ≥ 0             (2) 
where 𝑍" 𝑖  represents the lump sum profits distributed to the households.8  
3.1.2 Firms 
There is a continuum of firms of measure 1, with prices set as described by Calvo (1983). 
Every period, a firm (𝑖) sets its price and has an equal probability of revising the price with 
probability 1 − 𝛼. In the next phase, a firm uses labor inputs to meet the demand, and for 
simplicity one unit of labor produces one unit of output. Following Eggertsson (2010) and 
Denes et al. (2013), we assume that the government distributes its spending on varieties de-
fined as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate similar to households consumption; hence, the demand 
function for good 𝑖 takes the form of 𝑦" 𝑖 = 	𝑌"[(𝑝_𝑡	(𝑖))/𝑃_𝑡	]+@, with the aggregate output 
represented as 𝑌" ≡ 𝐶" + 𝐺". All the output is consumed either by the private sector or by the 
government. We assume that all the profits are distributed as dividends and that firms seek to 
maximize their profits net of taxes. Therefore, the profits for these firms are 
																																								 																				
8 See also Eggertsson (2010) and Denes et al. (2013) for a similar treatment. 
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𝑍" 𝑖 = 𝑝" 𝑖 𝑌" XY Z[Y +@ −𝑊" 𝑗 𝑌" XY Z[Y +@       (3) 
where 𝑖 represents the index for the firm and 𝑗 represents the index for the industry in which 
the firm operates. Since a firm can revise and set its price in every time period, we let 0 <𝛼 < 1 be the fraction of industries with prices that remain unchanged in each period. As a re-
sult, for any industry that revises its prices in period 𝑡, the new price 𝑝"∗ will be the same. 
Therefore, when a firm revises its price, it chooses to maximize the price 𝑝"∗ as maxXY∗ 𝐸" 𝛼𝛽 a+,𝜆a 1 − 𝜏ac [𝑝"∗𝑌a XY∗[d +@ −𝑊* 𝑗 𝑌* XY∗[d +@];a<" ,    (4) 
where 𝜆a is the marginal utility of the nominal income for the representative household. 
3.1.3 Government and central bank policy 
Our assumption is that the economy is in a recessionary era and therefore the central bank 
implements a zero lower bound policy. In this framework, the desired path for nominal inter-
est rates is described extensively by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). Similarly, we assume 
that interest rates cannot be negative: 𝑖" ≥ 0.             (5) 
We build the government’s budget constraint, which is given in Eq. (6), in the spirit of 
Denes et al. (2013). The main difference is that our model uses two types of taxes: 𝑏" = 1 + 𝑖"+, 𝑏"+,𝛱"+, + 1 − 𝜏"N 𝑌" − 𝑇",        (6) 
where 𝑏" ≡ gY[Y is the real value of the government debt and 𝛱" ≡ [Y[Yhi is the gross inflation.  
3.1.4 Equilibrium 
The model is log-linearized around a constant solution with positive government debt 𝑏 > 0 
and inflation 𝜋" ≥ 0. It can be solved by an approximation around a steady state. In particu-
lar, the consumption Euler equation of the representative household combined with the re-
source constraint can be approximated to yield 𝑌" = 𝐸"𝑌"k, − 𝜎 𝑖" − 𝐸"𝜋"k, − 𝑟"n + (𝐺"K − 𝐸"𝐺"k,K ) + 𝜎𝜒N𝐸"(𝜏"k,N − 𝜏"N),  (7) 
13 
	
where 𝑖" is the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate, 𝐸" an expectation operator, and 𝐺"K 
the percentage changes in government spending from its steady state as a fraction of the 
steady-state output. The coefficients are 𝜒N > 0, 𝑌" ≡ log sYs ,	and 𝐺" ≡ log tYs . Notably, 𝜏"N ≡𝜏"N − 𝜏N; hence, a 1% increase in government spending will increase the income tax and tax 
revenues by exactly the same amount. Finally, 𝑟"n is an exogenous disturbance that varies as a 
function of shock 𝜉". The coefficients explained above are defined following Eggertsson 
(2010). 
Accordingly, the aggregate supply (AS) is given by 𝜋" = 𝜅𝑌" + 𝜅𝜓 𝜒N𝜏"N − 𝜎+,𝐺"K + 𝛽𝐸"𝜋"k,,                   (8) 
where the coefficients 𝜅 > 0, 𝜓 > 0, 0 < 𝛽 < 1, and 𝜋"k, > 𝜋" > 0 and the zero bound is 
such that 𝑖" ≥ 0.  
Following Denes et al. (2013), the government budget constraint can be approximated 
to yield 
ws 𝑏" − ws 1 + 𝑟 𝑏"+, = ws 1 + 𝑟 𝚤"+, − 𝜋" + 1 + 𝜏Z 𝐺"K − 𝜏N𝑌" − 𝜏"N − 𝑇",  (9) 
where 𝑏" ≡ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 gY[Y − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑏 and  𝑇" ≡ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 *Ys . 
3.1.5 Short-run and long-run policy allocations 
To solve the model at the steady state, we introduce three assumptions that are quite common 
in the literature following the works of Eggertsson (2010) and Denes et al. (2013). We distin-
guish between short-run and long-run periods in the model. The long run is defined in the 
model as the period in which the shock, 𝑟"n, from an increase in government spending or from 
a decrease in income taxes has moved to the steady state. In the short-run period, the econo-
my is subject to the disturbance shock from the fiscal intervention, which is defined as 𝑟"n =𝑟zn, to satisfy the commitment that interest rates will stay at the zero bound. 
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Assumption 1. In period 0, there is a shock 𝑟zn < 𝑟 that reverts to the steady state with proba-
bility 1 − 𝜇 in each period. We call the stochastic period in which the shock reverts to the 
steady state 𝑡J and assume that 1 − 𝜇 1 − 𝛽𝜇 − 𝜇𝜎𝜅 > 0. 
Accordingly, for the fiscal policy: 
Assumption 2. 𝑡"N = 𝐺" = 0 for	∀𝑡 and future lump sum taxes 𝑇" are set so that the govern-
ment budget constraint is always satisfied, as defined in Equation (9), while 𝑇" = 0 for ∀	𝑡 <𝑡J. 
Our assumption for the monetary policy provides a different treatment: 
Assumption 3: For nominal interest rates, we consider two cases:  
i) Short-term nominal interest rates are set to 𝑖" = 0 so that 𝜋" = 𝑌" = 0. If this requires 𝑖" <0, then we assume 𝑖" = 0 and 𝜋" is endogenously determined. 
ii) If positive interest rates are required, there is a locally unique bounded equilibrium with 
inflation and output such that  𝜋" = 𝜋JX ∀	𝑡 < 𝑡𝑆          (10) 𝑌" = 𝑌JX ∀	𝑡 < 𝑡𝑆          (11) 𝑖" = 𝑖JX = 𝑟Jn + 𝜑𝜋J + 𝜑𝑌J 	> 0                  (12) 
Given Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the fiscal policy is perfectly correlated with the shock, 
since we consider an increase in spending to be followed by an increase in tax revenue and a 
decrease in income tax to be followed by a decrease in government spending.9 We focus on 
the equilibrium at the zero lower bound by looking at the comparative effectiveness of the 
fiscal policy in the short and the long run when the zero bound is binding. The central bank 
seeks to stimulate economic growth (output), and inflation thus becomes an endogenous ob-
ject. Accordingly, Assumption 3 implies that 𝜋" = 𝑌" for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡z in the short run when the zero 
bound condition is not binding.  
																																								 																				
9 Assumption 3 is developed and discussed in a more sophisticated way by Eggertsson (2010), with identical 
policy rules.	
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As we have discussed in equation (2), a lump sum tax 𝜏" is used as a residual variable 
that adjusts over time so that the government budget constraint is always satisfied. Based on 
this condition and following Denes et al. (2013), we make Assumption 4 with slightly differ-
ent tax policy rules in the short run (0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡J). 
Assumption 4: The budget deficit is stabilized after the shock from the increase in government 
spending or the reduction in income taxes by using the lump sum tax so that we let 𝑡"N, 𝐺" =𝑡", 𝐺 = 0 for ∀	𝑡 ≥ 𝑡J and 𝑡"N, 𝐺" = 𝑡J, 𝐺J = 0 for ∀	0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡J. The lump sum taxes 𝜏" on dates 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡J are set so that the government budget is balanced, while 𝜏" = 0 for ∀	0 ≤𝑡 ≤ 𝑡J. 
Overall, with respect to the above-mentioned assumptions, our model satisfies the fol-
lowing equations: 1 − 𝜇 𝑌J = −𝜎𝑖J + 𝜎𝜇𝜋z + 𝜎𝑟Jn + 1 − 𝜇 𝐺J − 𝜎𝜒N 1 − 𝜇 𝜏JN ,              (13) 𝜋J = 𝜅𝑌J + 𝜅𝜓 𝜒N𝜏JN − 𝜎+,𝐺J + 𝛽𝜇𝜋J,                 (14) 𝐷J = ws 1 + 𝚤 𝑖J − 𝜋J + 1 + 𝜏N 𝐺J − 𝜏N𝑌J − 𝜏JN − s 𝜏JN ,              (15) 
Next, the following two propositions are introduced to compute the government 
spending and income tax cut multipliers.  
Proposition 1: Supposing that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold, the output multiplier for gov-
ernment spending with a positive and zero interest rate is 
𝛥𝑌J𝛥𝐺J = 𝜓𝜎+, > 0																																																		𝑖𝑓			𝑖J > 0	(𝑖. 𝑒.		𝑟Jn > 0)1 − 𝜇 1 − 𝛽𝜇 − 𝜇𝜅𝜓1 − 𝜇 1 − 𝛽𝜇 − 𝜎𝜇𝜅 > 1															𝑖𝑓			𝑖J = 0	 𝑖. 𝑒.		𝑟Jn < 0 	 
Accordingly, the proposition can be modified so that the interest rates remain at the 
zero lower bound even when government spending produces a significant increase in output. 
Proposition 2: Supposing that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold, the output multiplier for income 
tax cuts with a positive and zero interest rate is 
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𝛥𝑌J𝛥𝜏JN = −𝜒𝜓 > 0																																																		𝑖𝑓			𝑖J > 0	(𝑖. 𝑒.		𝑟Jn > 0)−𝜎𝜒N 𝜇𝜅𝜎𝜓1 − 𝜇 1 − 𝛽𝜇 − 𝜎𝜇𝜅 > 1								𝑖𝑓			𝑖J = 0	 𝑖. 𝑒.		𝑟Jn < 0 . 
Propositions 1 and 2 parameterize the model and provide closed-form solutions for the effect 
on the output of a one-percent change in each of the fiscal instruments (increase in govern-
ment spending and income tax cuts).10  
3.2 Calibration 
To calibrate the DSGE model, we map the equilibrium conditions in Section 3.1 to set up a 
state-space model. Due to the small sample size, applications to the big four countries in the 
euro area are more suitable for VAR models. Therefore, we follow the recommendation of 
Christiano et al. (2006) and use an SVAR model to calibrate and validate a theoretical DSGE 
model. We build on the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Beetsma and Giulio-
dori (2011) to set up a reduced-form SVAR model that is informationally sufficient for the 
two structural fiscal shocks (see also Forni et al., 2014 for further discussions). Initially, we 
consider the following specification: 𝑌" = 𝛿𝛦"𝑌"k, + 𝑘" + 𝜉"+𝜀"                   (16) 
where 𝑌" is a forward-looking process representing the output, which is affected by a station-
ary process 𝑘", an expansionary fiscal policy shock 𝜉", and 𝜀"~𝑁	𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑., which captures the 
non-fiscal spending shocks affecting the output. We allow the fiscal multipliers to differ un-
der a slightly modified policy cycle scheme with an increase in government spending or a de-
crease in income taxes.  
The effect of expansionary fiscal spending shocks to the economy is not linear and 
changes over time from the short run to the medium run, allowing for two regimes. In the 
model, government purchases are represented by 𝐺, output by 𝑌, country-specific cyclically 
adjusted net taxes (i.e. tax revenues) by 𝑇𝑅, and the interest rate by 𝑟. These variables are the 
																																								 																				
10 Eggertsson (2010) and Denes et al. (2013) use similar approaches with slightly different policy rules. 
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endogenous variables, enter into the vector [𝐺, 𝑌, 𝑇𝑅, 𝑟], and are ordered according to a low-
er-triangular Cholesky decomposition.11 All the variables are in natural logarithms, except for 
the interest rate, which is in percentages. In particular, the structural shock 𝜉" takes the fol-
lowing form: 𝜉" = 𝛺 𝛢" − 𝐸 𝛢"⎸𝛢"+,                    (17) 
where  𝛢" is the vector of our observed macroeconomic variables and 𝛢"+, the history of 𝛢" 
up to the time 𝑡 − 1. 𝛢" − 𝐸 𝛢"⎸𝛢"+,  thus represents the forecast error and 𝛺 the rotation 
matrix. Let 𝛾 ∈ 𝛤 be the vector of parameters of the log-linearized DSGE model, which are 
unknown and are to be estimated. We combine a likelihood function with a prior distribution 
to obtain a posterior distribution of the model parameters. The log-linearized DSGE model 
can be expressed as follows (see, e.g., Anderson, 2010; Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2004; 
Ghent, 2009): 𝛺+,𝜉"+, + 𝛺9𝜂"𝛺,𝛦"𝜂"k, = 𝐷𝜉",	                 (18) 
where 𝜉" is a q-dimensional vector with i.i.d. standard normal structural shocks so that 𝜉"~𝛮(0, 𝐼) and 𝜂" is an r-dimensional vector of model variables, defined as deviations from 
the steady state. The matrices 𝛺Z 𝑟×𝑟 , with 𝑖 = −1, 0, 1 and 𝐷	(𝑟×𝑞), are functions of γ. 
A unique and convergent solution of Equation (18) exists at a particular value of γ so 
that the model variables are represented in a state-space model in an SVAR system in the fol-
lowing two equations (Sargent, 1989): 𝜂" = 𝐹𝜉"+, + 𝐵𝜂"                    (19) 
where 𝐹	(𝑟×𝑟) and 𝐵	(𝑟×𝑞) are uniquely determined by γ. We denote the observed variables 
by 𝑦", in an n-dimensional vector, and the measurement error 𝜀" is linked to the model varia-
bles 𝜂" as 
																																								 																				
11 To take into account the cross-country heterogeneity in the response of net taxes to changes in output, cycli-
cally adjusted net taxes are more appropriate than unadjusted net taxes (Alesina et al., 2002; Beetsma and Giu-
liodori, 2011).	
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𝑦" = 𝜆 + 𝛷 𝜂" + 𝜀"                   (20) 
Note that 𝜀" is assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian with mean zero and covariance matrix 𝑅, 
while 𝜆 represents the population mean at the steady state of 𝑦" conditional on γ. The meas-
urement errors and the shocks are independent, and matrices 𝑅 and 𝛷 are uniquely deter-
mined by γ. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Sample data 
We follow Romer and Romer’s (2010) approach to build our comparable data set for the four 
largest eurozone economies. The data set covers the period from March 2002 to December 
2015 and is constructed from official documents provided by Eurostat, the European Central 
Bank, and Datastream International. In particular, we use quarterly data of the gross domestic 
product (GDP), government debt, the budget balance, discretionary government spending and 
investments, private and household consumption, and tax revenue collections.  
Figure 1 depicts the fiscal position of the four largest eurozone economies from 2002 
to 2015. The fiscal position is readjusted annually to reflect the real deficit or surplus reported 
by the countries. We observe that the best-performing country is Germany, with the largest 
deficit of about 4% in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 (i.e., the period from 2008 
to 2010). Since 2012, Germany has achieved a marginal fiscal surplus. We also observe that 
Spain had a fiscal surplus until the crisis of 2008, when government interventions caused an 
initial deficit of 10%. Italy and France have a deficit of 3% and 5%, respectively. 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
 In the following, we successively discuss the results related to the effect of govern-
ment purchases and tax cut shocks on all four economies and the estimate for the multipliers 
for each of the four economies. 
4.2 Impulse responses 
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The set of endogenous variables in the baseline structural VAR consists of the government 
spending 𝐺 (the sum of government consumption and investment), cyclically adjusted net 
taxes (with country-specific cyclical adjustment)	𝑇𝑅, output (GDP) 𝑌, and long-run nominal 
interest rate 𝑟. The identification is based on a lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition ac-
cording to this particular ordering. Since we focus on impulse responses to government pur-
chases shocks, the relative ordering of the variables does not affect the impulse responses, as 
these variables are all ordered after government purchases (see also Christiano et al., 2006 for 
similar treatment).  
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
[Please insert Figure 2 about here] 
Table 1 reports the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a 1% increase in 
government purchases as a share of the GDP. The immediate effect of the expansionary fiscal 
policy on all the variables is positive for all the economies under consideration. This impact 
remains significant and apparent until five years after the fiscal shock for most variables. 
More precisely, the output immediately rises following the shock, and the increases range 
from 1.84% (Germany) to 2.18% (Spain). The largest response is observed one year later 
with output increases between 2.13% (Germany) and 2.52% (France). The cyclically adjusted 
net taxes only react significantly and immediately to the fiscal shock, with small effects rang-
ing from 0.36% (Germany) to 0.49% (Italy) and disappearing one year after the shock. The 
response of private consumption is smaller than 1% for all the countries. Noticeably, the 
long-run interest rate exhibits a significant upward trend, implying the existence of inflation-
ary pressures in the years following the positive shock to government spending. This trend 
can be explained by the fact that monetary policymakers have to raise interest rates to control 
inflationary pressures. In Germany, the interest rates increase to 3.51% five years after the 
shock. Regarding the budget balance (i.e., fiscal deficit–surplus), it responds positively to the 
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increase in government spending for all the economies, indicating that this fiscal policy trig-
gers the budget deficit.  
Figure 2 illustrates the baseline (overall average) impulse responses of the output, pri-
vate consumption, and budget balance to a 1% increase in government spending as a share of 
the GDP. The orange lines represent the confidence bands, while the red line shows the ag-
gregate effect on the economies of the four eurozone countries after 5,000 Monte Carlo simu-
lations that confirm our results presented in Table 1. The linear dashed trend line exhibits the 
trend caused by the fiscal shock. It should be noted that the government budget is allowed to 
deviate from the budget constraint in the Monte Carlo simulation to show the real effect that 
this policy has by producing a significant deficit without redistributing lump sum taxes to 
balance the budget. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
The impulse responses to a 1% decrease in taxes as a share of the GDP are presented 
in Table 2. The results show that the effect of the tax cut policy on the economy is smaller 
than in the case of a positive shock to government spending. As expected, the cyclically ad-
justed net taxes experience a significant and immediate decrease. The effect of tax cuts on the 
output is positive and significant, and it lasts until five years after the shock for all the coun-
tries. The largest and smallest immediate impulse responses are found in Germany (1.47%) 
and in Spain (0.77%). As for the other variables, they respond positively and significantly to 
the reduction in taxes, except for the budget balance, which improves (i.e., a reduction of the 
budget deficit) after the shock given its significant decreases. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 provides the impulse responses to a government spending shock at the zero 
lower bound monetary policy and a long-term commitment to future high inflation, as pro-
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posed by Krugman (1998).12 As we can see, the results obtained are broadly similar to those 
in Table 2 with respect to the tax cut policy in that the fiscal shock at the zero lower bound 
interest rates produces positive responses from all the variables with the exception of the net 
taxes and budget balance. However, the magnitude of the shock effects is much greater. A 
close look at the results shows that the output increases significantly for all the countries and 
its responses to the shock remain at a high level even five years later. The immediate increase 
in the output ranges from 3.57% (Spain) to 4.11% (Germany). The largest output increase is 
found one year after the shock and reaches 4.08% in Spain, 4.24% in Italy, 4.39% in France, 
and 4.67% in Germany. It is also important to note that the combination of the fiscal expan-
sionary and the zero lower bound policy cause a significant increase in the long-run interest 
rate just after the shock, which helps control inflationary pressures. As expected, due to the 
fiscal expansionary policy with increases in government spending, the budget balance is neg-
atively affected in the short run for all the economies. On the contrary, in the long run, the 
benefits from stimulating economic growth ameliorate the effect on the government budget. 
Notably, an interesting picture is uncovered for the effect on the cyclically adjusted net taxes. 
More precisely, the initial net taxes are affected negatively, but in the long run they have a 
positive trend, indicating an increase in the collection of taxes. 
Overall, our results reveal that the strongest effect on the economy during the reces-
sionary period is achieved by an expansionary fiscal policy driven by an increase in govern-
ment spending associated with a long-term commitment to keeping the interest rates at the ze-
ro lower bound. This policy also triggers greater inflationary pressures. 
4.3 Time and trend effects 
As a robustness check for the results of the baseline models, we also use annual data to tackle 
the anticipation effects in our quarterly data set. Concretely, Tables 4, 5, and 6 report the im-
																																								 																				
12 In this case, the short-term interest rates are not allowed to change due to inflationary pressures, so the condi-
tion 𝑟"n = 𝑟zn described in Section 3.2 is satisfied. 
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pulse responses to fiscal shocks (i.e., an increase in government spending, tax cuts, and an in-
crease in government spending combined with a long-term commitment to keeping the inter-
est rate at the zero lower bound, respectively) using annual data with quadratic time and trend 
effects in the regression. This adjustment allows the model to take into consideration the 
trend of the economy and is in line with the approach used in the extant literature (e.g., 
Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011; Caggiano et al., 2015).  
Importantly, the impulse responses closely resemble to those from the baseline esti-
mation. Specifically, the results are similar if we compare the shock effects between the quar-
terly data without quadratic time and trend effects (Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3) with the 
annual data (Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6). The unique difference is the smaller magnitude 
of the shock effects for all cases when the time and trend effects are introduced into the 
SVAR model. The results also confirm that the combined effect on the output from a gov-
ernment spending shock and a long-term commitment to keeping the interest rate at the zero 
lower bound is stronger than the effect caused by a pure government spending or tax cut poli-
cy.  
[Please insert Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here] 
More precisely, the results in Table 4 indicate that a positive shock to government 
spending triggers a significant and immediate increase in the economic output, with values 
ranging from 0.82% (France) to 0.93% (Germany), compared with values from 1.84% (Ger-
many) to 2.18% (Spain) in Table 1. The growth effect of the fiscal shock remains significant 
until five years afterwards. The shock effect is also the same for net taxes, private consump-
tion, long-run interest rates, and the budget balance. As regards Table 5, the implementation 
of the tax cut policy generates a positive and immediate response from the output, but the ef-
fect is not necessarily smaller than the government spending shock shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
This finding suggests that the historical paths of an economy matter for the shock absorption 
and growth recovery following the stimulus policies. Countries with a better fiscal balance 
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could recover and escape from the liquidity trap more easily. With the tax cut-driven policy, 
the budget balance improves immediately, as it responds negatively and significantly to the 
shock. Last but not least, Table 6 confirms the superiority of the government spending shock 
under the zero lower bound commitment for a long period in terms of the growth effect and 
fiscal balance improvement, owing to the high economic growth rate and tax collections. The 
inflationary pressure is observed immediately and becomes challenging only in the long run, 
but the pressure is less than in the case of a stimulus policy based on government spending.     
4.4 The effect of a large government debt 
In addition, we simulate a scenario in which the budget deficit of the four eurozone countries 
under consideration, measured by the budget balance as a share of the GDP, is restricted not 
to exceed 3% during the first year of the implementation of the fiscal stimulus policy due to 
existing high levels of government debt. The 3% deficit refers to the threshold level of the 
Maastricht Treaty. To achieve this, we impose an increase in the tax rate whenever this con-
dition is binding to keep the deficit at 3%. This systematic response is similar in spirit to that 
of Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011).  
[Please insert Tables 7, 8, and 9 about here] 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 report the results obtained from the impulse responses when the 
system is shocked respectively by an increase in government spending, tax cuts, and a com-
bination of government spending and long-term commitment at the zero lower bound. We 
mainly find that the impulse responses of system variables to fiscal shocks are essentially 
consistent with the ones provided by the baseline model (i.e., the results of Tables 1, 2, and 
3). However, the effects on the output are smaller, and some countries would be able to re-
duce their budget deficit two years after a fiscal shock affecting government spending (i.e., 
the cases of France, Italy, and Spain). The fiscal shock based on government spending to-
gether with long-term zero lower bound interest rates is still found to be the best policy op-
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tion, as it produces the highest growth rate and allows the sample countries to improve their 
fiscal situation significantly in the long run.  
4.5 The fiscal multipliers  
One way to assess empirically the effectiveness of different fiscal policy options regarding 
economic growth is to compare the fiscal multipliers across policy options, that is, the effect 
of a change in government spending (ΔGs) or in tax cuts (Δtc) on output variations (ΔY). We 
do so by computing the fiscal multipliers in four different scenarios: i) an increase in gov-
ernment spending; ii) an increase in government spending under the assumption of a high 
public debt level (the restriction of a government deficit lower than 3%); iii) tax cuts; and iv) 
tax cuts under the assumption of a high public debt level. These scenario-based multipliers 
are computed for two distinct environments: i) the nominal interest rate responds to the im-
plemented fiscal shocks and thus increases in the long run; and ii) the nominal interest rate is 
kept at the zero lower bound with a long-term commitment to generating future inflation.  
The results, reported in Table 10, show that the government spending fiscal multiplier 
has the strongest impact on economic growth. It ranges from 1.09 (France) to 1.173 (Germa-
ny) within the positive interest rate environment. The multiplier is much lower when tax cuts 
are used to stimulate the economy, as it varies between 0.201 (Spain) and 0.639 (Germany). 
Regarding the associated multipliers, both fiscal policies exert very small effects on the out-
put when the constraint of a 3% budget deficit at most is introduced, suggesting that a high 
level of public debt could prevent the economy from achieving a quick recovery. The output 
effect of fiscal policies improves significantly when they are associated with the zero lower 
bound monetary policy, particularly in the case of government spending with fiscal multipli-
ers above 1.8, for all the countries. Taken together, the insights from the fiscal multipliers 
show evidence of greater effectiveness of a government spending shock than the tax cut poli-
cy, regardless of the interest rate environment. More importantly, the effectiveness of the fis-
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cal stimulus policy by increasing government spending is the greatest when it is combined 
with a long-term commitment to zero lower bound interest rates.  
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
[Please insert Figure 3 about here] 
We depict the temporal paths of some estimated multipliers in Figure 3. As it can be 
seen, the government spending fiscal shock multiplier at the zero lower bound (red line) has 
the strongest output effect on stimulating the economy, followed by the tax cut policy (red 
line). The pink line shows the magnitude of the government spending multiplier when taking 
into account a large government debt.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we examine the effect of government spending and tax cut shocks at the zero 
lower bound on the economic growth of the big four eurozone economies. Our theoretical 
framework is built on a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model proposed by Eggertsson (2010) and extended by Denes et al. (2013). This model al-
lows for a commitment to a constant nominal interest rate over the long run, and it is calibrat-
ed by employing an SVAR approach to the sample economies.  
 Our main results show that fiscal shocks through government spending are more ef-
fective than a tax cut policy in stimulating economic growth, particularly when there is a 
long-term commitment to keeping interest rates at the zero lower bound. Indeed, the estimat-
ed government spending multipliers are greater than 1.8 for all the countries when the zero 
lower bound is binding, and the nominal interest rates do not respond to fiscal shocks. This 
finding implies that the implementation of a government spending program can stabilize an 
economy in a time-consistent way with a positive long-run effect on the output and an im-
provement of the fiscal situation (a reduction of the budget deficit). Importantly, the short-
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term effect on the budget balance can be offset and improved five years after the implementa-
tion of this policy. The increase in government spending creates significant inflationary pres-
sures in the medium and long run. It is worth noting that government spending programs 
could also be useful for counteracting the deflation experienced in eurozone economies at the 
zero lower bound. On the contrary, tax cuts are found to have a smaller effect on the output; 
therefore, an alternative policy with tax cuts that aims to expand the supply does not have the 
same power with zero lower bound interest rates. Finally, we find that a large government 
debt significantly diminishes the magnitude of both government spending and tax cut multi-
pliers, rendering these policies ineffective when an unconventional monetary policy reaches 
its limits. 
  
27 
	
References 
Aiyagari, R., Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., 1992. The output, employment and interest rate 
effects of government consumption. Journal of Monetary Economics 30 (1): 73–86. 
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., Perotti, R., Schiantarelli, F., 2002. Fiscal policy, profits, and in-
vestment. American Economic Review 92 (3): 571–589. 
Anderson, G.S., 2010. A reliable and computationally efficient algorithm for imposing the 
saddle point property in dynamic models. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34: 
472–489. 
Baxter, M., King, R.G., 1993. Fiscal policy in general equilibrium. American Economic Re-
view 83 (3): 315–334. 
Beetsma, R., Giuliodori, M., 2011. The effects of government purchases shocks: Review and 
estimates for the EU. Economic Journal 121 (550): F4–F32.  
Blanchard, O., Dell’Ariccia, G., Mauro, P., 2010. Rethinking macroeconomic policy. Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking 42 (6): 199–215.  
Blanchard, O., Perotti, R., 2002. An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of 
changes in government spending and taxes on output. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
117 (4): 1329–1368. 
Boubaker, S., Gounopoulos, D., Nguyen, D.K., Paltalidis, N., 2017. Assessing the effects of 
unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates on pension fund risk incentives. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 77: 35–52. 
Caggiano, G., Castelnuovo, E., Colombo, V., Nodari, G., 2015. Estimating fiscal multipliers: 
News from a non-linear world. Economic Journal 125 (584): 746–776. 
Calvo, G.A., 1983. Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 12 (3): 383–398. 
Canzoneri, M., Collard, F., Dellas, H., Diba, B., 2015. Fiscal multipliers in recessions. Eco-
nomic Journal 126 (590): 75–108. 
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., Rebelo, S., 2011. When is the government spending multi-
plier large? Journal of Political Economy 119 (1): 78–121. 
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., Vigfusson, R., 2006. Assessing structural VARs. NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 21: 1–106. 
Cogan, J.F., Cwik, T., Taylor, J.B., Wieland, V., 2010. New Keynesian versus Old Keynesian 
government spending multipliers. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34: 281–
295.  
Correia, I., Fahri, E., Nicolini, J.P., Teles, P., 2013. Unconventional fiscal policy at the zero 
lower bound. American Economic Review 103 (4): 1172–1211. 
Crafts, N., Mills, T.C., 2013. Rearmament to the rescue? New estimates of the impact of 
Keynesian policies in 1930s’ Britain. Journal of Economic History 73 (4): 1077–1104. 
Del Negro, M., Schorfheide, F., 2004. Priors for general equilibrium models for VARs. In-
ternational Economic Review 45 (2): 643–673. 
Denes, M., Eggertsson, G.B., Gilbukh, S., 2013. Deficits, public debt dynamics and tax and 
spending multipliers. Economic Journal 123 (566): F133–F163. 
28 
	
Eggertsson, G.B., 2010. What fiscal policy is effective at zero interest rates? In (D. Acemoglu 
and M. Woodford, ed.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 25: 59–122, New York: Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research. 
Eggertsson, G.B., Woodford, M., 2003. The zero bound on interest rates and optimal mone-
tary policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 139–211. 
Eggertsson, G.B., Woodford, M., 2004. Policy options in a liquidity trap. American Econom-
ic Review 94 (2): 76–79. 
Eser, F., Schwaab, B., 2016. Evaluating the impact of unconventional monetary policy 
measures: Empirical evidence from the ECB’s securities markets programme. Journal of 
Financial Economics 119 (1): 147–167. 
Fernandez-Villaverde, J., Gordon, G., Guerron-Quintana, P., Rubio-Ramirez, J.F., 2015. 
Nonlinear adventures at the zero lower bound. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 
57: 182–204. 
Forni, M., Gambetti, L., Sala, L., 2014. No news in business cycles. Economic Journal 124: 
1168-1191. 
Galí, J., López-Salido, D.J., Vallés, J., 2007. Understanding the effects of government spend-
ing on consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association 5 (1): 227–270. 
Ghent, A.C., 2009. Comparing DSGE-VAR forecasting models: How big are the differences? 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33: 864–882. 
Hicks, J.R., 1937. Mr. Keynes and the classics. Econometrica 5 (2): 147–159. 
Joyce, M., Miles, D., Scott, A., Vayanos, D., 2012. Quantitative easing and unconventional 
monetary policy – An introduction. Economic Journal 122 (564): F271–F288. 
Keynes, J.M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Krugman, P.R., 1998. It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap. Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 137–187. 
Leeper, E.M., Plante, M., Traum, N., 2010. Dynamics of fiscal financing in the United States. 
Journal of Econometrics 156 (2): 304–321. 
Leeper, E.M., Traum, N., Walker, T.B., 2017. Clearing up the fiscal multiplier morass. Amer-
ican Economic Review 107 (8): 2409–2454. 
Mertens, K., Ravn, M., 2014. Fiscal policy in an expectations-driven liquidity trap. Review of 
Economic Studies 81 (4): 1637–1667. 
Ramey, V.A., 2011a. Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the timing. Quarter-
ly Journal of Economics 126 (1): 1–50. 
Ramey, V.A., 2011b. Can government purchases stimulate the economy? Journal of Econom-
ic Literature 49 (3): 673-685. 
Ramey, V.A., Zubairy, S., 2018. Government spending multipliers in good times and in bad: 
Evidence from U.S. historical data. Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming). 
Romer, C.D., Romer, D.H., 2010. The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: Estimates 
based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. American Economic Review 100 (3): 763–801. 
Sargent, T.J., 1989. Two models of measurement and the investment accelerator. Journal of 
Political Economy 97 (2): 251–287. 
29 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
	
 
Figure 1. Budget balance as a percentage of the GDP 
Notes: The figure exhibits quarterly changes in the budget balance for the four eurozone economies 
from 2002 to 2015. 
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Figure 2. Overall average impulse responses of the output, private consumption, and budget balance 
to a 1% increase in government purchases as a share of the GDP 
Notes: The confidence bands (the light blue lines) are the fifth and the ninety-fifth percentiles from 
Monte Carlo simulations based on 5000 replications. The red line provides the median estimation over 
the replications. The solid blue line shows the trend effects of fiscal shocks on the variables under 
consideration. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative estimation of the fiscal multipliers  
Notes: The light blue line shows the government spending multiplier. The bold blue line 
shows the trend of the fiscal spending multiplier. The red line shows the tax cut multiplier, 
and the pink line shows the magnitude of the government spending multiplier under the hy-
pothesis of a large government debt. The multipliers are plotted against the debt to steady-
state GDP ratio to show that as debt increases so does the multiplier (blue line), but a large 
government debt renders a fiscal expansionary policy ineffective (orange line). 
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Table 1. Responses to a fiscal shock of a 1% increase in government spending as a share of the GDP 
– Baseline model 
 
Impact  
effect 
After  
one year 
After  
three years 
After  
five years 
Baseline – France 
    Output 2.06* 2.52* 1.83* 0.61* 
Net taxes 0.47* 0.66 0.37 0.19 
Government purchases 0.90* 1.08* 0.30* 0.09* 
Private consumption 0.58* 0.82* 0.31* 0.14* 
Long-run interest rate 2.47* 0.84 2.32* 2.98* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.26* 0.12* 0.34* 0.72* 
     Baseline – Germany 
    Output 1.84* 2.13* 1.66* 0.57* 
Net taxes 0.36* 0.52 0.28 0.10 
Government purchases 0.96* 1.10* 0.42* 0.10* 
Private consumption 0.54* 0.79* 0.35* 0.18* 
Long-run interest rate 2.78* 0.91 2.75* 3.51* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.40* 0.27* 0.50* 0.81* 
     Baseline – Italy 
    Output 2.14* 2.47* 1.92* 0.71* 
Net taxes 0.49* 0.68 0.37 0.21 
Government purchases 0.92* 1.19* 0.35* 0.11* 
Private consumption 0.66* 0.90* 0.37* 0.15* 
Long-run interest rate 2.33* 0.52 2.00 3.16* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.25* 0.09* 0.38* 0.78* 
     Baseline – Spain 
    Output 2.18* 2.48* 1.97* 0.79* 
Net taxes 0.48* 0.71 0.40 0.14 
Government purchases 0.93* 1.24* 0.36* 0.09* 
Private consumption 0.68* 0.94* 0.41* 0.19* 
Long-run interest rate 2.37* 0.61 2.19 3.11* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.30* 0.13* 0.40* 0.80* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, which is in basis points, 
and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 2. Responses to a fiscal shock of a 1% decrease in taxes as a share of the GDP – Baseline mod-
el 
 
Impact 
effect 
After  
one year 
After  
three years 
After 
five years 
Baseline – France 
    Output 1.24* 1.35* 0.66* 0.18* 
Net taxes –0.78* –0.51 0.07 0.22 
Government purchases 0.81* 0.94* 0.35* 0.10* 
Private consumption 0.43* 0.51* 0.11* 0.07* 
Long-run interest rate 0.03* 0.04 0.02 0.00* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.26* –0.34* –0.13* –0.05* 
     Baseline – Germany 
    Output 1.47* 1.83* 0.70* 0.24* 
Net taxes –0.85* –0.74 0.02 0.30 
Government purchases 1.02* 1.20* 0.52* 0.24* 
Private consumption 0.46* 0.55* 0.18* 0.08* 
Long-run interest rate 0.05* 0.07 0.03* 0.02 
Budget balance/GDP –0.31* –0.42* –0.18* –0.10* 
     Baseline – Italy 
    Output 1.02* 1.26* 0.51* 0.04* 
Net taxes –0.59* –0.45 0.06 0.23 
Government purchases 0.70* 0.76* 0.25* 0.08* 
Private consumption 0.22* 0.30* 0.08* 0.02* 
Long-run interest rate 0.02* 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Budget balance/GDP –0.24* –0.33* –0.12* –0.03* 
     Baseline – Spain 
    Output 0.77* 0.91* 0.33* 0.01* 
Net taxes –0.52* –0.40 0.06 0.24 
Government purchases 0.53* 0.62* 0.11* 0.02* 
Private consumption 0.18* 0.24* 0.05* 0.01* 
Long-run interest rate 0.01* 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Budget balance/GDP –0.22* –0.28* –0.07* –0.01* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, which is in basis points, 
and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 3. Responses to a government spending shock at the zero lower bound policy with long-term 
commitment (Krugman, 1998) – Baseline model 
 
Impact effect 
After  
one year 
After  
three years 
After  
five years 
Baseline – France 
    Output 4.01* 4.39* 3.75* 2.43* 
Net taxes –0.53* –0.48 0.26 0.30 
Government purchases 1.64* 1.96* 1.35* 0.47* 
Private consumption 1.28* 1.59* 0.94* 0.38* 
Long-run interest rate 1.95* 0.46 2.08* 2.61* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.73* –0.62* –0.47* –0.28* 
     Baseline – Germany 
    Output 4.11* 4.67* 3.92* 2.86* 
Net taxes 0.29* –0.05 0.36 0.41 
Government purchases 2.01* 2.42* 1.80* 0.93* 
Private consumption 1.43* 1.70* 0.97* 0.45* 
Long-run interest rate 2.37* 0.94 2.40* 3.36* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.46* –0.58* –0.39* –0.24* 
     Baseline – Italy 
    Output 3.89* 4.24* 3.56* 1.94* 
Net taxes –1.20* –0.67 –0.21 0.11 
Government purchases 1.48* 1.72* 1.18* 0.30* 
Private consumption 1.12* 1.36* 0.72* 0.31* 
Long-run interest rate 1.97* 0.29 1.56 3.00* 
Budget balance/GDP –1.03* –1.14* –0.72* –0.36* 
     Baseline – Spain 
    Output 3.57* 4.08* 3.10* 1.53* 
Net taxes –1.48* –1.02 –0.44 –0.26 
Government purchases 1.10* 1.46* 0.95* 0.20* 
Private consumption 1.03* 1.20* 0.62* 0.28* 
Long-run interest rate 1.88* 0.21 1.14 2.76* 
Budget balance/GDP –1.28* –1.33* –0.92* –0.55* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, which is in basis points, 
and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 4. Responses to a fiscal shock of a 1% increase in government spending as a share of the GDP 
– Quadratic time effects and trends 
 
Impact 
effect 
After  
one year 
After  
three years 
After  
five years 
Quadratic time effects and trends – France 
  Output 1.97* 2.28* 1.70* 0.54* 
Net taxes 0.42* 0.61 0.33 0.15 
Government purchases 0.82* 1.00* 0.27* 0.08* 
Private consumption 0.51* 0.76* 0.26* 0.11* 
Long-run interest rate 1.85* 0.51 1.70* 2.59* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.20* 0.07* 0.29* 0.41* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Germany 
  Output 1.71* 2.01* 1.62* 0.54* 
Net taxes 0.34* 0.50 0.27 0.10 
Government purchases 0.93* 1.08* 0.40* 0.09* 
Private consumption 0.52* 0.77* 0.31* 0.16* 
Long-run interest rate 2.00* 0.68 1.84* 2.21 
Budget balance/GDP 0.37* 0.24* 0.45* 0.76* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Italy 
  Output 2.02* 2.40* 1.88* 0.63* 
Net taxes 0.44* 0.61 0.34 0.17 
Government purchases 0.88* 1.07* 0.30* 0.08* 
Private consumption 0.61* 0.80* 0.33* 0.11* 
Long-run interest rate 1.98* 0.36 1.59 2.48* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.22* 0.02* 0.30* 0.71* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Spain 
  Output 2.04* 2.44* 1.91* 0.65* 
Net taxes 0.46* 0.67 0.36 0.12 
Government purchases 0.91* 1.20* 0.33* 0.06* 
Private consumption 0.62* 0.90* 0.37* 0.16* 
Long-run interest rate 2.01* 0.42 1.65 2.53* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.25* 0.01* 0.26* 0.51* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, which is in basis points, 
and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 5. Responses to a fiscal shock of a 1% decrease in taxes as a share of the GDP – Quadratic time 
effects and trends 
 
Impact 
effect 
After  
one year 
After  
three years 
After  
five years 
Quadratic time effects and trends – France 
  Output 1.06* 1.12* 0.60* 0.13* 
Net taxes –0.86* –0.59 0.01 0.20 
Government purchases 0.74* 0.90* 0.31* 0.08* 
Private consumption 0.38* 0.43* 0.09* 0.05* 
Long-run interest rate 0.03* 0.03 0.02 0.00* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.34* –0.45* –0.18* –0.09* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Germany 
  Output 1.30* 1.57* 0.61* 0.22* 
Net taxes –0.89* –0.75 0.01 0.24 
Government purchases 0.95* 1.12* 0.48* 0.21* 
Private consumption 0.42* 0.50* 0.12* 0.03* 
Long-run interest rate 0.03* 0.03 0.02* 0.01 
Budget balance/GDP –0.35* –0.48* –0.19* –0.12* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Italy 
  Output 0.94* 1.10* 0.45* 0.03* 
Net taxes –0.62* –0.47 0.01 0.20 
Government purchases 0.63* 0.71* 0.20* 0.04* 
Private consumption 0.18* 0.25* 0.04* 0.01* 
Long-run interest rate 0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Budget balance/GDP –0.29* –0.38* –0.16* –0.09* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Spain 
  Output 0.68* 0.80* 0.27* 0.00* 
Net taxes –0.59* –0.51 0.01 0.10 
Government purchases 0.48* 0.55* 0.07* 0.01* 
Private consumption 0.14* 0.19* 0.03* 0.01* 
Long-run interest rate 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Budget balance/GDP –0.29* –0.36* –0.04* –0.01* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, which is in basis points, 
and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 6. Responses to a government spending shock at the zero lower bound policy with long-term 
commitment (Krugman, 1998) – Quadratic time effects and trends  
 
Impact 
effect 
After  
one year 
After  
three years 
After  
five years 
Quadratic time effects and trends – France 
  Output 3.92* 4.19* 3.61* 2.20* 
Net taxes –0.59* –0.52 0.21 0.27 
Government purchases 1.58* 1.89* 1.31* 0.34* 
Private consumption 1.15* 1.42* 0.86* 0.30* 
Long-run interest rate 1.19* 0.21 0.90* 1.75* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.76* –0.68* –0.53* –0.34* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Germany 
  Output 4.02* 4.38* 3.76* 2.29* 
Net taxes 0.23* –0.09 0.21 0.38 
Government purchases 1.75* 2.10* 1.54* 0.76* 
Private consumption 1.23* 1.50* 0.92* 0.36* 
Long-run interest rate 1.20* 0.23 0.97* 1.90* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.41* –0.44* –0.31* –0.13* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Italy 
  Output 3.61* 4.02* 3.37* 1.70* 
Net taxes –1.39* –0.74 –0.28 0.02 
Government purchases 1.32* 1.48* 0.88* 0.19* 
Private consumption 0.90* 1.06* 0.63* 0.27* 
Long-run interest rate 1.12* 0.16 0.67 1.28* 
Budget balance/GDP –1.48* –1.82* –0.95* –0.61* 
Quadratic time effects and trends – Spain 
  Output 3.30* 3.87* 2.96* 1.11* 
Net taxes –1.82* –1.45 –0.78 –0.44 
Government purchases 0.91* 1.20* 0.76* 0.17* 
Private consumption 0.82* 1.01* 0.53* 0.20* 
Long-run interest rate 1.06* 0.12 0.61 1.23* 
Budget balance/GDP –1.53* –1.89* –0.98* –0.72* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, which is in basis points, 
and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 7. Responses to a fiscal shock of a 1% increase in government spending as a share of the GDP 
under the hypothesis of a large government debt 
Budget deficit < 3% 
Impact ef-
fect 
After one 
year 
After three 
years 
After five 
years 
Anticipated effects – France 
   Output 1.12* 1.36* 0.62* 0.10* 
Net taxes 0.34* 0.52 0.21 0.11 
Government purchases 0.76* 0.93* 0.23* 0.06* 
Private consumption 0.45* 0.70* 0.22* 0.09* 
Long-run interest rate 1.76* 0.40 1.52* 2.28* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.07* –0.23* 0.01* 0.30* 
Anticipated effects – Germany 
   Output 0.98* 1.17* 0.60* 0.14* 
Net taxes 0.29* 0.42 0.23 0.08 
Government purchases 0.87* 0.98* 0.34* 0.07* 
Private consumption 0.48* 0.72* 0.25* 0.12* 
Long-run interest rate 1.83* 0.44 1.52* 2.01 
Budget balance/GDP 0.30* 0.20* 0.41* 0.72* 
Anticipated effects – Italy 
   Output 1.23* 1.62* 0.85* 0.19* 
Net taxes 0.34* 0.51 0.24 0.13 
Government purchases 0.81* 0.92* 0.27* 0.06* 
Private consumption 0.58* 0.74* 0.29* 0.09* 
Long-run interest rate 1.64* 0.28 1.33 2.18* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.10* –0.19* 0.22* 0.47* 
Anticipated effects – Spain 
   Output 1.20* 1.57* 0.94* 0.18* 
Net taxes 0.40* 0.59 0.31 0.08 
Government purchases 0.83* 0.93* 0.29* 0.07* 
Private consumption 0.56* 0.72* 0.24* 0.08* 
Long-run interest rate 1.71* 0.31 1.40 2.29* 
Budget balance/GDP 0.06* –0.30* –0.04* 0.32* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, which is in basis points, 
and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 8. Responses to a fiscal shock of a 1% decrease in taxes as a share of the GDP under the hy-
pothesis of a large government debt 
Budget deficit < 3% 
Impact ef-
fect 
After 
one year 
After 
three years 
After 
five years 
Anticipated effects – France 
  Output 0.39* 0.46* 0.22* 0.11* 
Net taxes –0.93* –0.67 –0.19 0.02 
Government purchases 0.65* 0.83* 0.20* 0.05* 
Private consumption 0.30* 0.36* 0.07* 0.03* 
Long-run interest rate 0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.00* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.45* –0.58* –0.31* –0.20* 
Anticipated effects – Germany 
   Output 0.47* 0.73* 0.50* 0.17* 
Net taxes –0.97* –0.89 –0.34 –0.07 
Government purchases 0.82* 0.99* 0.41* 0.19* 
Private consumption 0.35* 0.40* 0.08* 0.01* 
Long-run interest rate 0.03* 0.03 0.02* 0.01 
Budget balance/GDP –0.44* –0.56* –0.28* –0.15* 
Anticipated effects – Italy 
   Output 0.29* 0.41* 0.25* 0.01* 
Net taxes –0.73* –0.55 –0.27 0.02 
Government purchases 0.55* 0.62* 0.13* 0.02* 
Private consumption 0.14* 0.20* 0.03* 0.00 
Long-run interest rate 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Budget balance/GDP –0.47* –0.59* –0.38* –0.25* 
Anticipated effects – Spain 
   Output 0.14* 0.53* 0.18* 0.00* 
Net taxes –0.74* –0.69 –0.30 –0.06 
Government purchases 0.41* 0.48* 0.04* 0.01* 
Private consumption 0.11* 0.16* 0.01* 0.00 
Long-run interest rate 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Budget balance/GDP –0.52* –0.65* –0.43* –0.27* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are ex-
pressed as a percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, 
which is in basis points, and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a 
percentage of the GDP. 
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Table 9. Responses to a government spending shock at the zero lower bound policy with long-term 
commitment (Krugman, 1998) under the hypothesis of a large government debt 
Budget deficit < 3% 
Impact ef-
fect 
After  
one year 
After  
three years 
After  
five years 
Anticipated effects – France 
   Output 3.11* 3.25* 2.40* 1.03* 
Net taxes –0.68* –0.59 0.03 0.21 
Government purchases 1.40* 1.61* 1.14* 0.27* 
Private consumption 1.00* 1.34* 0.69* 0.23* 
Long-run interest rate 1.12* 0.17 0.80* 1.68* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.81* –0.73* –0.59* –0.41* 
Anticipated effects – Germany 
   Output 3.12* 3.41* 2.60* 1.07* 
Net taxes 0.19* –0.15 0.18 0.32 
Government purchases 1.60* 1.78* 1.33* 0.51* 
Private consumption 1.01* 1.22* 0.79* 0.28* 
Long-run interest rate 1.02* 0.12 0.83* 1.66* 
Budget balance/GDP –0.48* –0.51* –0.35* –0.17* 
Anticipated effects – Italy 
   Output 2.70* 3.19* 2.21* 0.58* 
Net taxes –1.47* –0.92 –0.39 –0.10 
Government purchases 1.16* 1.27* 0.72* 0.15* 
Private consumption 0.75* 0.89* 0.58* 0.22* 
Long-run interest rate 0.97* 0.10 0.48 1.17* 
Budget balance/GDP –1.59* –1.91* –1.06* –0.78* 
Anticipated effects – Spain 
   Output 2.37* 2.74* 1.51* 0.27* 
Net taxes –1.97* –1.68 –0.92 –0.63 
Government purchases 0.75* 0.98* 0.59* 0.11* 
Private consumption 0.60* 0.81* 0.40* 0.12* 
Long-run interest rate 0.92* 0.07 0.42 1.01* 
Budget balance/GDP –1.78* –2.01* –1.44* –0.96* 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. The impulse responses are ex-
pressed as a percentage of the underlying variable, except for the long-run interest rate, 
which is in basis points, and the budget balance to GDP ratio, which is expressed as a 
percentage of the GDP. 
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Table 10. Fiscal multipliers in distinct interest rate environments 
 
i > 0 (positive interest 
rate) 
i = 0 (zero lower 
bound) 
 
GDP effect GDP effect 
France   
ΔΥ/ΔGs  1.090 1.843 
ΔΥ/ΔGs with the government debt effect 0.163 0.199 
ΔΥ/Δtc  0.482 0.619 
ΔΥ/Δtc with the government debt effect 0.002 0.013 
   
Germany   
ΔΥ/ΔGs  1.173 1.829 
ΔΥ/ΔGs with the government debt effect 0.168 0.217 
ΔΥ/Δtc  0.639 0.850 
ΔΥ/Δtc with the government debt effect 0.004 0.018 
   
Italy   
ΔΥ/ΔGs  1.135 1.973 
ΔΥ/ΔGs with the government debt effect 0.089 0.094 
ΔΥ/Δtc  0.267 0.451 
ΔΥ/Δtc with the government debt effect 0.001 0.007 
   
Spain   
ΔΥ/ΔGs  1.124 1.986 
ΔΥ/ΔGs with the government debt effect 0.073 0.090 
ΔΥ/Δtc  0.201 0.373 
ΔΥ/Δtc with the government debt effect 0.000 0.001 
Notes: This table shows the fiscal multipliers for the big four eurozone economies with respect to 
the effects of government spending and tax cuts within two interest rate environments: positive in-
terest rates and zero lower bound interest rates. ΔΥ, ΔGs, and Δtc refer to changes in the output, 
government spending, and tax cuts. The government debt effect is represented by the restriction 
that the budget deficit is not allowed to exceed 3% in the first year of the implementation of the fis-
cal policy. i > 0 implies that the zero lower bound does not bind in the long run, because nominal 
interest rates respond to fiscal policy shocks and will increase, while i = 0 exists when the zero 
lower bound is binding and the nominal interest rate does not respond to the fiscal shocks. 
 
